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Enrichment
Mitchell McInnes*
Due to the high value that it placed upon the ownership of land, the common law 
traditionally was wary of intervening if the plaintiff non-contractually improved the 
defendant’s land. For the most part, liability was imposed only if the landowner acted 
unconscionably according to the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. Recently, however, 
Canadian courts have expanded the scope of relief in two respects. First, the test for 
proprietary estoppel has been revised and relaxed. Second, the cause of action in unjust 
enrichment is now widely employed as an alternative source of liability. While neither 
development is necessarily wrong, the implications of those changes have received too 
little attention. A sensitive balance must be struck between the interests of worthy 
claimants and the interests of innocent landowners. 
* Faculty of Law, University of Alberta.
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I. Introduction
If the plaintiff improves the defendant’s land, will the owner be held liable? From a historical perspective, that question was unlikely to 
receive a robust response. The defendant obviously was obliged to pay 
if the plaintiff acted pursuant to a contract between the parties. Absent 
an agreement, however, the improver’s prospects were slim. That was 
particularly true in law. Active claims were refused recognition and the 
passive right of set-off was severely restricted. Montreuil v Ontario Asphalt 
Co.1 provides a dramatic illustration. Believing that it had acquired a lease 
and an option to purchase from a landowner, a company spent a small 
fortune building a dock and a factory on the property. Unfortunately, 
the purported holder of the fee simple then discovered that he held a 
mere life estate, and, worse yet, died a few years later. The company was 
anxious to reach some agreement, but the gentleman’s children, as the 
remaindermen, were uncooperative. Proceeding in law, they recovered 
possession through an action in ejectment and they were awarded mesne 
1. (1922), 63 SCR 401 [Montreuil].
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profits, representing reasonable rental value, with respect to the trespass 
that the company committed following the expiration of the lease. The 
company was not so fortunate. As both of the original parties had been 
mistaken as to the nature of the lessor’s interest, the equitable doctrine of 
proprietary estoppel was inapplicable. Further, because the children had 
proceeded entirely in law, the company could not, by pleading that “[h]e 
who seeks equity must do equity”, invoke the equitable doctrine of set-
off, which would have encompassed the full value of the improvements.2 
The company, instead, was limited to its legal remedies, which consisted 
exclusively of law’s miserly right of set-off. Having made permanent 
improvements to the property in the bona fide belief that it was in lawful 
occupation, it was entitled to compensation, but only “to the extent of 
the rents and profits claimed” by the children.3 Since the trespass was 
worth a small fraction of the $100,000 that the company had spent on 
the improvements, the children came away with a substantial windfall.4 
The situation in equity was better, but far from generous. While 
proprietary estoppel (or the doctrine of acquiescence) has long provided 
relief, it historically was formulated narrowly. The claimant was required 
to satisfy the “five probanda” articulated in Wilmott v Barber5 (“Wilmott”):
[i]n the first place the plaintiff must have made a mistake as to his legal rights. 
Secondly, the plaintiff must have expended some money or must have done some 
act (not necessarily upon the defendant’s land) on the faith of his mistaken 
belief. Thirdly, the defendant, the possessor of the legal right, must know 
of the existence of his own right which is inconsistent with the right claimed 
by the plaintiff. … Fourthly, the defendant … must know of the plaintiff’s 
mistaken belief of his rights. … Lastly, the defendant … must have encouraged 
the plaintiff in his expenditure of money or in the other acts which he has done, 
either directly or by abstaining from asserting his legal right.6 
Proof of the five probanda demonstrated a form of fraud that led equity 
2. Neesom v Clarkson (1845), 67 ER 576 (Ch); Richards v Collins, 9 DLR 
249 (Ont Div Ct). 
3. Montreuil, supra note 1 at 439. See also Geldhof v Bakai (1982), 139 DLR 
(3d) 527 (Ont HC); Farquhar v Sherk, (1979), 14 RPR 18 (Ont Dist Ct).
4. The case was remitted to trial for a determination of precise values. 
5. (1880), 15 Ch D 96 at (Eng) 105-106 [Wilmott].
6. Ibid. See also Ramsden v Dyson and Thornton (1866), LR 1 HL 129 
[emphasis added].
424 
 
McInnes, Improvements to Land
to “restrain the possessor of the legal right from exercising it”.7 The precise 
means by which it did so was a function of an unusually broad discretion 
aimed at identifying “the minimum equity [required] to do justice 
between the parties”.8 The possibilities, which were virtually unlimited, 
included the transfer of title.9 By definition, however, proprietary estoppel 
traditionally was confined to a narrow band of cases. If the defendant 
did not, actively or passively, improperly induce the plaintiff to act, then 
there was no basis for judicial intervention and the landowner’s windfall 
was left to lie where it fell.10 
The explanation for the historical reluctance to award relief for 
improvements to land is reasonably clear. Rights in real property were all 
but sacrosanct. Land, a scarce resource in a relatively small country, was 
the main repository of wealth and source of power prior to the industrial 
revolution. That fact, coupled with a fierce conception of personal 
autonomy, understandably resulted in an unwillingness to impose 
liability upon landowners. The danger was twofold. By its very nature, 
land is susceptible to services to an extent that other forms of property 
are not. It was easy to imagine a house mistakenly built on the wrong side 
of a boundary line, but impossible to conceive of a similarly substantial 
undertaking affecting a chattel. And even if liability was in personam, it 
might well entail a debt so large as to be satisfied only with the proceeds 
7. Wilmott, supra note 5 at 106.
8. Crabb v Arun District Council, [1976] Ch 179 at 189 (CA (Eng)) [Crabb].
9. Dillwyn v Llewelyn (1862), 45 ER 1285 (QB); Pascoe v Turner, [1979] 
1 WLR 431 (CA (Civ)(Eng)); Brogden v Brogden, (1920), 53 DLR 362 
(ABCA); Cowderoy v Sorkos Estate, 2012 ONSC 1921 [Cowderoy].
10. It is occasionally said that proprietary estoppel may apply regardless of 
context: Amalgamated Investment and Property Co Ltd v Texas Commerce 
International Bank Ltd, [1982] QB 84 (CA (Civ)(Eng))(enforcement of 
loan guarantee); Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings, [1977] AC 
890 (HL)(existence of competing interest in vehicle). Canadian courts, 
however, have generally confined the equitable doctrine to interests in 
land, as Justice Crawford held in Silverstone Trucking Ltd v Pacific Dispatch 
Ltd, 2015 BCSC 533 (“[a]s this case does not relate to real property, any 
claim of proprietary estoppel fails” at para 68). See also Maritime Telegraph 
and Telephone Co v Château Lafleur Development Corp, 2001 NSCA 167 
at paras 37, 50; Sabey v Beardsley, 2014 BCCA 360 at para 32 [Sabey]. 
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from the sale of land. 
Circumstances, of course, have changed. Land is not so scarce in a 
country the size of Canada. Moreover, while a home frequently remains 
a person’s most valuable asset, wealth increasingly is held in other forms. 
Real property may be a single part of a diversified portfolio. Wealthy 
individuals in the twenty-first century are just as likely to trace their 
privileged positions to copyrights and patents as to land. Highly valuable 
services may be rendered with respect to chattels and intangible assets as 
easily as they may be conferred upon real property. 
To some extent, the legal system has evolved in step with modern 
perspectives on land. The Supreme Court of Canada, for instance, has 
broken with the past by rejecting the presumption that every parcel is 
unique and hence capable of supporting an order for specific performance 
of a contract. “Residential, business, and industrial properties”, it 
explained, are “mass produced much in the same way as other consumer 
products” and therefore do not warrant special protection.11 The court 
has also recognized that traditional attitudes regarding title to land are 
no longer appropriate within the context of “joint family ventures”.12 
The redistribution of property rights upon the dissolution of marriage 
historically was unthinkable not only because courts tended to denigrate 
the nature of female domestic labour,13 but also because they believed 
11. Semelhago v Paramadevan, [1996] 2 SCR 415 (“[t]his approach may 
appear to be overly generous to the respondent in this case and other like 
cases and may be seen as a windfall. In my opinion, this criticism is valid 
if the property agreed to be purchased is not unique. While at one time 
the common law regarded every piece of real estate to be unique, with 
the progress of modern real estate development this is no longer the case. 
Residential, business, and industrial properties are all mass produced 
much in the same way as other consumer products. If a deal falls through 
for one property, another is frequently, though not always, readily 
available” at para 20) [Semelhago].
12. Kerr v Baranow, 2011 SCC 10 [Kerr].
13. Murdoch v Murdoch, [1975] 1 SCR 423 (dismissing the claim of a woman 
who had laboured on the family property for twenty years because she 
merely had performed “the work done by any ranch wife” at 436). 
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that title to Blackacre was too important to be varied by judicial fiat.14 
While English courts continue to resist the remedial constructive trust,15 
Canadian judges no longer recoil at the prospect of awarding proprietary 
relief.16 
Similarly, some provinces have adopted non-traditional attitudes 
towards land.17 If a structure or fence encroaches upon a neighbouring 
property in British Columbia18 or Manitoba,19 a judge is entitled to order 
its removal, grant an easement, or, most dramatically, vest title in the 
encroaching party upon payment of an appropriate price. Likewise, if, 
as a result of a mistaken belief that the land was the plaintiff’s own, a 
“lasting improvement” is made to the defendant’s property, betterment 
14. Pettkus v Becker, [1980] 2 SCR 834, Justice Martland (“[i]n my opinion, 
the adoption of this concept involves an extension of the law as so far 
determined in this Court. Such an extension is, in my view, undesirable. 
It would clothe judges with a very wide power to apply what has been 
described as ‘palm tree justice’ without the benefit of any guidelines. By 
what test is a judge to determine what constitutes unjust enrichment? The 
only test would be his individual perception of what he considered to be 
unjust” at 859) [Pettkus].
15. Chapman v Chapman, [1954] AC 429 (HL) at 444; Re Polly Peck 
International (No 2), [1998] 3 All ER 812 (CA (Civ)) at 830. 
16. Pettkus, supra note 14. Matrimonial property legislation similarly rejects 
the traditional view. For constructive trusts outside of family law, see 
Soulos v Korkontzilas, [1997] 2 SCR 217.
17. Mitchell McInnes, The Canadian Law of Unjust Enrichment and 
Restitution (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2014) at 327-31 [McInnes]. 
18. Property Law Act, RSBC 1996, c 377, s 36.
19. The Law of Property Act, CCSM 1997, c L90, s 28 [Law of Property Act].
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statutes in Alberta,20 Saskatchewan,21 Manitoba,22 and Ontario23 allow a 
court to either award the claimant a lien for the value of the improvement 
or require the claimant to retain the affected portion of the property and 
compensate the defendant’s resulting loss. 
In deciding to override the protection traditionally enjoyed by 
landowners, the Supreme Court of Canada and the provincial legislatures 
act upon policies formulated following careful consideration of competing 
interests. These decisions typically receive considerable attention among 
their target audience. As a result, there are normally opportunities, before 
or after the fact, for experts and affected parties to assess the situation and 
to comment on the wisdom of moving in one direction or another. 
In other instances, however, the legal system’s attitude regarding non-
contractual improvements to land has evolved piecemeal and without 
broad oversight. In a sense, that is the genius of the common law. The 
“heap of good learning”24 is forever changing, incrementally, one case at 
a time. That approach nevertheless provides pause for thought insofar as 
significant developments may occur largely unnoticed. That is true, to a 
lesser or greater degree, in the current context. 
The reformulation of the proprietary estoppel doctrine has been 
20. Law of Property Act, RSA 2000, c L-7, s 69.
21. Improvements Under Mistake of Title Act, RSS 1978, c I-1, s 2. See St Pierre 
v St Pierre, 2010 SKCA 20 (“[t]he claims he was entitled to statutory relief 
under The Improvements Under Mistake of Title Act and The Frustrated 
Contracts Act are without merit. The purpose of the former Act is to 
overcome the common law proposition that the true owner of land is 
entitled to everything attached to the land. It is intended to compensate 
someone who has an honest but mistaken belief that he or she was 
making lasting improvements to their own land. As the appellant was a 
wrongdoer, having induced someone to sell her home, he cannot expect to 
be compensated for his own wrongdoing” at para 18).
22. Law of Property Act, supra note 19, s 27. 
23. Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, RSO 1990, c C-34, s 37(1). 
24. Thomas Wood, An Institute of the Laws of England in Their Natural Order 
According to Their Common Use (1722), cited in Peter Birks, ed, English 
Private Law, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) at xliv. 
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comparatively high profile.25 For too long, the “five probanda” that 
Justice Fry articulated in Wilmott26 had been treated like “a Procrustean 
bed constructed from some unalterable criteria”,27 rather than simply 
a “valuable guide”.28 The doctrine’s usefulness had been unnecessarily 
cramped by a test that supported redress only if the defendant had 
knowingly duped the plaintiff into action. As a result, while traditions die 
hard, a number of Canadian courts have expressly redesigned proprietary 
estoppel.29 
Idle-O Apartments Inc v Charlyn Investments Ltd 30 (“Idle-O”) is a 
prime example. Idle-O purportedly leased part of a parcel to Charlyn for 
a term of 998 years. That lease, in fact, was void because it constituted 
an informal subdivision lasting more than three years.31 Nevertheless, 
because neither party appreciated the problem, Charlyn greatly improved 
the property over the next two decades. When the defect finally came 
25. A great deal of commentary has arisen in response to recent English 
cases that have revisited the scope of proprietary estoppel: Yeoman’s Row 
Management Ltd v Cobbe, [2008] UKHL 55; Thorner v Major, [2009] 
UKHL 18; cf. Blue Haven Enterprises v Tully and another, [2006] UKPC 
17 (Jam); David Neuberger, “The Stuffing of Minerva’s Owl? Taxonomy 
and Taxidermy in Equity” (2009) 68:3 Cambridge Law Journal 537; 
Martin Dixon, “Confining and Defining Proprietary Estoppel: The Role 
of Unconscionability” (2010) 30:3 Legal Studies 408; Ben McFarlane 
& Andrew Robertson, “Apocalypse Averted: Proprietary Estoppel in the 
House of Lords” (2009) 125:3 Law Quarterly Review 535. 
26. Wilmott, supra note 5. 
27. Taylor Fashions Ltd v Liverpool Victoria Trustees Co Ltd, [1981] 1 All ER 
897 (Ch) at 918.
28. Crabb, supra note 8 at 194.
29. Murphy v MacDonald, 2009 PESC 30 (applying traditional criteria and 
denying relief because the defendant was not aware of the plaintiff’s 
mistake) [Murphy]; Dutertre Manufacturing Inc v Palliser Regional Park 
Authority, 2012 SKQB 335 [Dutertre]. 
30. 2013 BCSC 2158 [Idle-0].
31. Land Title Act, RSBC 1996, c 250, s 73 (1)(b) provides: “[e]xcept on 
compliance with this Part, a person must not subdivide land into smaller 
parcels than those of which the person is the owner for the purpose of 
[...] (b) leasing it, or agreeing to lease it, for life or for a term exceeding 3 
years". 
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to light and Idle-O asserted exclusive possession under a declaration 
of invalidity, Charlyn sought protection in the doctrine of proprietary 
estoppel. The traditional test, of course, could not be satisfied. While 
Charlyn had acted in the mistaken belief that it held a long-term interest 
in the land, Idle-O was oblivious to that error, as well as its own rights. 
The title-holder certainly had not engaged in the sort of cynical fraud 
contemplated in Wilmott. Charlyn’s plea was nevertheless successful. As 
Justice Newbury explained in an excellent judgment, the “five probanda” 
have been “overtaken by a broader and less literal approach to proprietary 
estoppel”.32 An “equity” will arise in the improver’s favour if: 
i. “There was an assurance or representation, attributable to the owner, that the  
 claimant has or will have some right to the property”, and
ii. “The claimant relied on this assurance to his or her detriment so that it would 
 be unconscionable for the owner to go back on that assurance”.33
If both hurdles are cleared, “the court must [then] determine the extent 
of the equity and the remedy appropriate to satisfy the equity”.34 All 
of that was true on the facts of Idle-O even though both parties had 
laboured under the same mistake. While the invalid lease itself could 
not constitute an actionable representation, Idle-O’s conduct certainly 
encouraged Charlyn in the belief that it would enjoy the fruit of its own 
labour. Moreover, once Charlyn detrimentally relied on that inducement 
by spending a great deal of time and money on the property, it became 
unconscionable for Idle-O to strictly enforce its legal rights. Accordingly, 
Charlyn’s existing directors, as well as their children, were entitled to use 
the premises for recreational purposes for the remainder of their lives. 
Once the last member of that class has died, the cloud on Idle-O’s title 
will disappear. 
The specific manner in which the court reformulated proprietary 
32. Idle-0, supra note 30 at para 134, quoting Trethewey-Edge Diking District 
v Coniagas Ranches Ltd, 2003 BCCA 197 at para 64. See also Erickson v 
Jones, 2008 BCCA 379; Sabey, supra note 10; The Owners, Strata Plan VR 
10 v EE Management Corp, 2015 BCSC 473; Hawes v Dave Weinrauch 
and Sons Trucking Ltd, 2015 BCSC 540.
33. Sabey v Rommel, 2014 BCCA 360 at para 30.
34. Ibid. 
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estoppel obviously is important, but the fundamental reorientation of the 
doctrine is even more significant. Liability does not necessarily require 
proof that the defendant was culpably complicit in the plaintiff’s decision 
to act.35 The doctrine now responds, much more broadly, to the fact that 
it would simply be inequitable for the defendant to assert its legal rights 
to the plaintiff’s detriment. The essential element of unconscientiousness, 
which justifies equity in overriding the landowner’s legal rights, may be 
entirely ex post. 
In that sense, the modern Canadian conception of proprietary 
estoppel strongly resembles the action in unjust enrichment. The 
defendant may be held liable with respect to unrequested services even 
though it neither knew, nor ought to have known, that the plaintiff 
35. Whereas British Columbia’s Court of Appeal has adopted a two-stage test, 
its counterpart in Ontario has adopted a three-fold inquiry. See Clarke 
v Johnson, 2014 ONCA 237 (Peppal JA warned against rigid criteria, 
but said that proprietary estoppel occurs when “(i) the owner of the 
land induces, encourages or allows the claimant to believe that he has or 
will enjoy some right or benefit over the property; (ii) in reliance upon 
his belief, the claimant acts to his detriment to the knowledge of the 
owner; and (iii) the owner then seeks to take unconscionable advantage 
of the claimant by denying him the right or benefit which he expected 
to receive” at para 52) [Clarke]. See also Eberts v Carleton Condominium 
Corporation No 396 (2000), 136 OAC 317 (Ont CA) at para 23; Love 
v Schumacher Estate, 2014 ONSC 4080 at para 36 [Schumacher Estate]; 
Gold v Chronas, 2014 ONSC 6763; Brownlee v Kashin, 2015 ONSC 
1035 at para 69 [Brownlee]; Alexander James Wright v Candice Holmstrom, 
2015 ONSC 1906 at para 50; Servello v Servello, 2014 ONSC 5035 at 
para 103, per Justice Koke [Servello]. The same approach now prevails 
in Alberta: Parkdale Nifty Fifties Seniors Association v Calgary (City), 
2012 ABCA 301 at para 12; Rocky Mountain House (Town of ) v Alberta 
Municipal Insurance Exchange, 2007 ABQB 548 at para 22; Nelson v 
1153696 Alberta Ltd, 2009 ABQB 732 at para 235, appealed on other 
grounds in Nelson v 1153696 Alberta Ltd, 2011 ABCA 203. Some 
judges proceed more cautiously. In Cowderoy, supra note 9 at para 84, 
Justice Tausendfreund observed that proprietary estoppel traditionally 
encompassed two categories of cases – depending upon whether the 
defendant encouraged or merely acquiesced in the plaintiff’s acts – and held 
that the “five probanda” are not necessarily apposite in the former. 
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did not truly intend to confer a benefit. As a result, unjust enrichment, 
like the re-formulated model of proprietary estoppel, has the capacity 
to substantially undermine the courts’ traditional reluctance to impose 
liability for non-contractual improvements to land. 
II. The Risk of Restitution
Although the label is used ambiguously too often, “unjust enrichment” 
properly refers to the cause of action that governs unwarranted transfers 
between parties.36 As authoritatively framed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada, it requires proof that (i) the defendant received an enrichment; 
(ii) the plaintiff suffered a corresponding deprivation; and (iii) there was an 
absence of juristic reason for the transfer. Reference sometimes is made to 
a final stage of inquiry, consisting of four bars and defences.37 If the cause 
36. Canadian courts sometimes use “unjust enrichment” to refer to a situation 
in which the plaintiff proves that the defendant committed some form 
of civil wrong (e.g. breach of confidence, trespass to land, “exceptional” 
breach of contract), but instead of seeking compensation for losses 
suffered, demands “restitution” (or, more precisely, disgorgement) of the 
defendant’s ill-gotten gain. Critically, whereas true unjust enrichment 
and restitution require no breach and are confined to benefits that the 
defendant received from the plaintiff, the alternative model of liability 
typically is invoked to capture benefits that the defendant obtained from 
a third party as a result of violating the plaintiff’s rights. That is true, for 
instance, if a Crown prosecutor abuses the fiduciary position by accepting 
bribes from criminals. The government does not recover money that it 
previously possessed. As the victim of the operative breach, it strips away 
the enrichment that its dishonest agent obtained from the third parties: 
Attorney General of Hong Kong v Reid, [1994] 1 AC 324 (PC (NZ)); cf. 
Can Aero v O’Malley, [1974] SCR 592. 
37. Pettkus, supra note 14; Garland v Consumers’ Gas Co, 2004 SCC 25 
[Garland]. The underlying principle was first recognized in Deglman 
v Guaranty Trust Co of Canada and Constantineau, [1954] SCR 725 
[Deglman]. 
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of action is made out, restitution is the only possible response.38 The 
transfer between the parties is reversed and the status quo ante is restored. 
The plaintiff cannot get back more than was lost; the defendant cannot 
give back more than was gained. 
The roots of the modern action in unjust enrichment date back 
hundreds of years, but it was only during the second half of the twentieth 
century that the subject came into its own.39 It was even longer before 
the simple three-part claim was allowed to unfold naturally in the current 
context. Writing in 1992, Professor Fridman objected to the application 
of unjust enrichment as a “broad general principle” and insisted, in the 
event of non-contractual improvements to land, that “no claim will 
succeed where the defendant was given no opportunity to object to what 
was being done, i.e. did not actively acquiesce”.40 To impose liability 
against an “entirely innocent” landowner “on a restitutionary basis”, 
he said, “would result in an injustice”.41 Similarly, in 2004, Professors 
Maddaugh and McCamus wrote that “the full implications of the 
unjust enrichment principle have not been adopted” and said that relief 
for improvements to land has been “narrowly restricted to mistakes of 
ownership in the traditional sense”.42 
Significantly, as Fridman reported, while case-law was sparse, there 
was “no congruence between the law relating to improvements to land 
38. McInnes, supra note 17 at chs 32, 34, 35 (While the measure of relief is 
always the same, the form of restitution depends upon the circumstances. 
It is usually personal, but it exceptionally is proprietary. There is growing 
recognition that many traditional proprietary doctrines are best 
understood as restitution for unjust enrichment. That is true, for instance, 
of resulting trusts, rescission, and subrogation). 
39. By 1760, Lord Mansfield was able to draw a generalized principle from a 
rich body of case law: Moses v Macferlan (1760), 97 ER 676 (KB).
40. GHL Fridman, Restitution, 2d ed (Scarborough: Carswell, 1992) at 334, 
336 [Fridman].
41. Ibid.
42. Peter D Maddaugh & John D McCamus, The Law of Restitution, 
2d (Aurora, Ontario: Canada Law Book Inc, 2004)(Loose-leaf ) at § 
12:400.20 [Maddaugh & McCamus]. 
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and that pertaining to improvements to chattels”.43 The action in unjust 
enrichment was available to one who, for instance, repaired a vehicle 
following an apparently valid purchase.44 Goff & Jones, the pioneering 
English text, explained the essential difference:
It may seem odd to allow a bona fide improver of a chattel a claim for 
improvements and to deny a bona fide improver of land a comparable claim. 
But no English lawyer should be surprised that our law should treat chattels 
differently than land. Most chattels are not unique; they are fungible and 
replaceable. It may be unreasonable to require the owner of land to sell or 
mortgage in order to recompense the improver for unsolicited improvements. 
But it will not generally be unreasonable to require the owner of a chattel, 
who has obtained an unsolicited but incontrovertible benefit from another’s 
improvements, to sell his chattel to make restitution for the benefit, if that is 
the only way he can do so.45 
As the preceding quotation suggests, restitution carries a substantial risk 
insofar as it may impose an unfair burden upon an innocent recipient. 
The explanation lies in unjust enrichment’s unique nature.46 Most 
causes of action turn on the breach of an obligation. Once it has been 
determined that the defendant is a wrongdoer, a court will be justified 
in disrupting the status quo ante. It may strip away ill-gotten gains (i.e. 
43. Fridman, supra note 40 at 345. See also Gidney v Shank, [1995] 5 WWR 
385 (Man QB), reversed in Gxqidney v Shank, [1996] 2 WWR 383 (Man 
CA) [Gidney]; Thomas v Robinson, [1977] 1 NZLR 385 (SC) [Robinson].
44. Greenwood v Bennett, [1973] QB 195 (CA (Civ)(Eng)) [Greenwood]; 
Webb v Ireland, [1988] IR 353 (HC) [Webb]. 
45. Robert Goff & Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution, 3d (London: Sweet 
& Maxwell, 1986) at 147-48 [Goff & Jones].
46. McInnes, supra note 17 at 24-31 (“Strict liability” is an ambiguous 
phrase. It typically means that the defendant may be held liable for 
having breached an obligation even though the breach was neither 
deliberate nor negligent. That is true, for instance, under the actions 
for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of confidence, and trespass. In such 
circumstances, the defendant’s breach of that primary obligation triggers 
the imposition of a secondary (remedial) obligation. Unjust enrichment, 
in contrast, entails true strict liability. The defendant incurs liability, 
without any breach at all, simply by receiving a benefit from the plaintiff 
in the absence of any legal explanation. And since there is no breach, 
there is never any question of a secondary obligation. The duty to make 
restitution is a primary obligation that arises from the transfer itself ).
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disgorgement), extract reparation of losses (i.e. compensation), or even 
impose deliberate pain (i.e. punitive damages).47 The breach warrants 
the mistreatment. In other instances, the court’s justification lies in a 
prior agreement. While it is human nature to grumble, the defendant 
has no real complaint if a court demands performance of a contractual 
undertaking. Judicial intervention merely reflects a choice that the 
defendant previously exercised. 
Unjust enrichment, however, requires neither a wrong nor an 
agreement. The plaintiff may seek restitution for improvements to land 
even though the defendant was entirely innocent and unaware of those 
services at the time of conferral. If that claim is upheld, then there is a 
very real risk that the landowner will bear the burden of a benefit that was 
unnecessary, unwanted, and unaffordable. In the worst case scenario, as 
Goff & Jones contemplated, the defendant may be able to satisfy judgment 
only by liquidating the land. As a result of the plaintiff’s mistaken decision 
to act, the defendant may be compelled to sacrifice a long-cherished 
family home. That is not an attractive prospect.48 
III. Enrichment and Autonomy
Broadly speaking, the risk that restitution may create injustice may be 
managed at either the first stage or the third stage of the action in unjust 
enrichment. 
Enrichment is a deceptively simple concept. It serves at least three 
functions.49 To begin, it obviously demonstrates that the defendant 
47. Disgorgement almost always disrupts the status quo ante insofar as it 
leaves the plaintiff with a benefit that it never possessed and never would 
have obtained in the normal course of events. Punitive damages have the 
opposite effect insofar as they require the defendant to deplete untainted 
resources in order to satisfy judgment. Though the point occasionally 
is overlooked, the same is true of compensation. Unless the defendant 
coincidentally received a wrongful gain corresponding to the plaintiff’s 
wrongful loss, the payment of reparations necessarily will draw upon 
pre-existing funds. Compensatory damages hurt, albeit not as much as 
punitive damages. 
48. Goff & Jones, supra note 45.
49. McInnes, supra note 17 at ch 2. 
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received an objective benefit, which, when coupled with other elements, 
may support liability.50 Moreover, assuming that liability has been 
established, the measure of relief is governed by the value of the transfer 
between the parties; this is a function of the defendant’s gain and the 
plaintiff’s corresponding loss.51 And, most importantly for present 
purposes, the concept of enrichment provides the primary means by 
which the courts protect innocent recipients from hardship. It does so 
by ensuring that the risk of liability is consistent with the defendant’s 
autonomy. 
It is not enough for the plaintiff to prove the transfer of an objective 
benefit. The common law “was founded on a philosophy of robust 
individualism which expected every person to look out after his or her 
own interests and which place[d] a premium on the right to choose 
how to spend one’s money”.52 The recipient of an objective benefit 
consequently enjoys the right of subjective devaluation.53 That label is a bit 
misleading. The defendant may be personally delighted to have a benefit, 
but still escape liability. The explanation lies in the fact that subjective 
50. Peel (Regional Municipality) v Canada, [1992] 3 SCR 762 (“[t]he word 
‘enrichment’ ... connotes a tangible benefit” at para 45) [Peel]; Peter 
v Beblow, [1993] 1 SCR 980 (“[t]his court has consistently taken a 
straightforward economic approach to the first two elements of the test 
for unjust enrichment” at 990) [Beblow]. 
51. Air Canada v British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 1161 (restitution “is not 
intended to provide windfalls to plaintiffs who have suffered no loss. Its 
function is to ensure that where a plaintiff has been deprived of wealth 
… it is restored to him” at 1202); Kerr, supra note 12 (unjust enrichment 
means “not simply that the defendant has been enriched, but also that the 
enrichment corresponds to a deprivation which the plaintiff has suffered” 
at para 39); Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5 (liability in unjust 
enrichment “will be allowed in the lesser of the following two amounts: 
that of the enrichment of [the defendant] and that of [the plaintiff’s] 
own impoverishment” at para 119); cf. Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New 
Brunswick (Finance), 2007 SCC 1. 
52. Peel, supra note 50 at 785-86. 
53. Stevested Machinery & Engineering Ltd v Metso Paper Ltd, 2014 BCCA 91 
at para 60; Valley v McLeod Valley Casing Services Ltd, 2004 ABQB 302 
at para 145 [McLeod]; Sherbeth v Sherbeth, 2007 MBQB 50 at para 22 
[Sherbeth]. 
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devaluation is a test of autonomy. It allows the defendant to turn to the 
plaintiff and say, “it is not your job to make my choices”.54 Suppose, 
for example, that a landscaping company, erroneously arriving at the 
wrong address, artistically sculpts the landowners’ hedges into fantastical 
shapes. That service has market value. Some people pay good money 
for it. Nevertheless, whether they are amused or horrified to discover 
the topiary on their front yard, the owners presumptively never chose to 
expend resources on such whimsy. 
A. Request and Free Acceptance
Given the doctrine of subjective devaluation, recognition of a legal 
enrichment is premised upon proof that restitution would not intolerably 
override the recipient’s autonomy. There are two possibilities. First, the 
plaintiff may prove that the defendant actually chose to accept the risk 
of liability, either actively through a request55 or passively through free 
54. Magical Waters Fountain Ltd v Sarnia (1990), 74 OR (2d) 682 (Ont Ct 
J (Gen Div)) at 691, per Justice Gautreau, appealed on other grounds 
in Magical Waters Fountains Ltd v Sarnia (1992), 8 OR (3d) 689 (CA). 
See also JRM Gautreau, “When Are Enrichments Unjust?” (1989) 10:3 
Advocates’ Quarterly 258 (“[t]he choice of how to invest one’s time, 
effort and money should not be forced on one. Freedom of choice is the 
dominant consideration in these cases” at at 261).
55. Of course, a request that elicits performance may support recognition of a 
contract: St John Tug Boat Co Ltd v Irving Refinery Ltd, [1964] SCR 614. 
If so, unjust enrichment generally is a non-issue.
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acceptance.56 A request normally57 demonstrates both a desire to receive 
and a willingness to pay.58 Accordingly, if the plaintiff duly performs, 
the defendant cannot complain if the court compels payment. Much 
the same is true, under the doctrine of free acceptance, if the defendant 
chooses to accept a proffered benefit despite knowing that the plaintiff 
expects payment and despite a reasonable opportunity to reject.59 In 
effect, silent acquiescence is deemed to constitute a decision to assume 
56. As of 2004, a transfer is reversible not because of the presence of an unjust 
factor, but rather because of the absence of juristic reason: Garland, supra 
note 37 discussed below at Part V.B. As a result, free acceptance has “now 
been overtaken” as a test of injustice: Kerr, supra note 12 at para 121. It 
nevertheless continues to serve, more narrowly, as a test of enrichment. 
57. Exceptions do arise. Within a family unit, in which benefits are routinely 
conferred gratuitously, one may genuinely request a service without any 
expectation of subsequently being provided with a demand for payment. 
Much the same may be true even in a commercial context. For instance, 
an injured worker may seek out a psychologist’s services in the mistaken 
belief that the psychologist would look to the employer for payment: Tang 
v Jarrett, [2009] OJ No 1282 (Sup Ct J)(QL). So too, a homeowner may 
ask for a realtor’s help in selling a property in the mistaken belief that 
the agent expected payment only in the event of a sale: Seale & Associates 
Inc v Vector Aerospace Corp, [2009] OJ No 1456 (Sup Ct J)(QL); Sugar v 
Kim Orr Barristers Professional Corp, 2012 ONSC 6668 (firm requested 
lawyer’s assistance in drafting pleadings in belief that services were offered 
on a contingency basis). 
58. The request doctrine is extended slightly if, for example, a benefit is either 
demanded at gunpoint or taken without permission. The courts will 
not allow a person to improperly frustrate the normal operation of the 
marketplace. One who demands or takes is treated as the same as one who 
requests: 720654 Alberta Ltd v El Hajj, 2011 ABPC 64. 
59. Pettkus, supra note 14; Binichakis v Smitherman, 2009 BCPC 131; Park 
Georgia Realty Ltd v Mayfair Lanes Canada Ltd, 2009 BCSC 1322 at para 
73. 
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the risk of liability.60 
B. Incontrovertible Benefit
The second category of enrichment is more controversial. Instead of 
turning upon the nature of the defendant’s conduct, it turns upon the 
nature of the enrichment itself. As Justice McLachlin explained, normally, 
it “would be wrong to make the defendant pay” for an unsolicited benefit 
“since he or she might well have preferred to decline the benefit if given a 
choice”.61 An incontrovertible benefit, however, is “demonstrably apparent 
and not subject to debate or conjecture”. It is “not the antithesis of 
freedom of choice” — it “exists when freedom of choice as a problem is 
absent”.62 
Money is an incontrovertible benefit.63 As the very means by which 
value is recognized and expressed, it cannot be subjectively devalued. It 
is always valuable and it is equally valuable regardless of who holds it. If 
the recipient does not wish to be held liable, money can always be given 
back. Even if the specific notes and coins received from the plaintiff no 
longer are on hand, others can be returned in their place. Money, after 
all, is fungible. One $20 bill is as good as the next. 
Services, in contrast, can never be restored in specie. As Baron Pollock 
famously said, “[o]ne cleans another’s shoes; what can that other do 
60. That proposition is somewhat controversial. A person who requests a 
benefit outside of a social setting is indeed normally prepared to pay. In 
contrast, a non-solicited benefit may be freely accepted not because one 
intends to pay, but rather because one cares too little to even voice an 
opinion. In that sense, the doctrine constitutes a rare positive obligation 
in private law. 
61. Peel, supra note 50 at 795.
62. Ibid.
63. BP Exploration Co (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No 2), [1979] 1 WLR 783 (QB 
(Eng)), per Justice Goff (“[m]oney has the peculiar character of a universal 
medium of exchange. By its receipt the recipient inevitably is benefitted” 
at 799). See also Sharwood & Co v Municipal Financial Corp (2001), 197 
DLR (4th) 477 (Ont CA) at 485; Halifax (City) v Nova Scotia (Attorney 
General)(1997), 163 NSR (2d) 360 (SC) at 370. 
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but put them on”?64 The courts consequently must exercise great care 
in recognizing non-monetary incontrovertible benefits. In effect, the 
court must be satisfied that, given the impugned transfer, it is as if the 
defendant received money. This will be true in two circumstances. 
A benefit may arise positively through an accretion to pre-existing 
resources or negatively through the discharge of an obligation.65 And if an 
obligation represents a necessary expense, either legally or factually, then its 
satisfaction creates an incontrovertible benefit.66 Suppose, for instance, 
that each landowner bears a statutory obligation to upgrade a sewer 
line on its property. As a result of an error, the plaintiff upgrades the 
defendants’ line rather than its own, at a cost of $25,000. Assuming that 
the expense would have been the same in either event, the defendants 
necessarily are enriched.67 It is as if they received money. The pre-existing 
resources that they necessarily would have used to discharge their 
statutory duty can be directed to the claimant instead. And while they 
have no choice about reversing the unjust enrichment, they similarly had 
64. Taylor v Laird (1856), 25 LJ Ex 329 (Eng) at 332. The same observations 
apply, mutatis mutandis, with respect to goods that have been consumed. 
65. Peel, supra note 50 at 790; Carleton (County) v Ottawa (City), [1965] SCR 
663.
66. A legally necessary expense is relatively simple because the operative 
obligation usually admits little, if any, scope for dissent. A tax demand, 
for instance, normally dictates the amount and the timing of the required 
payment. In contrast, because a factually necessary expense may be a 
function of personal circumstance, a court must take care to ensure that 
the defendant had no real choice in the matter. For instance, does the 
installation of an air conditioning unit represent a factually necessary 
expense? What if the defendant lives in Arizona or the Yukon? What if the 
defendant is fabulously wealthy or desperately poor? As the category of 
factually necessary expense expands, the defendant’s autonomy contracts. 
67. The incontrovertible benefit exists insofar as a necessary expense has been 
anticipated. Consequently, if the defendants could have satisfied their 
statutory obligation at a cost of $20,000, then that is the value of their 
enrichment even if it cost the plaintiff $25,000 to upgrade the sewer line. 
By the same token, restitution will be limited to the lesser amount, under 
the second element of the action in unjust enrichment, if the plaintiff 
spends only $20,000 in order to discharge an obligation that would have 
cost the defendants $25,000. 
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no choice about upgrading their sewer line. Restitution leaves them none 
the worse for wear. 
The same is true if the defendants receive a benefit from which they 
realize a financial gain. Suppose, for instance, that the defendants own 
an empty parcel that they intend to sell for $50,000. Before they do so, 
the plaintiff acts in error and builds a house on the property at a cost 
of $150,000. The defendants then sell the improved lot for a price of 
$200,000. They are in the same position they would have enjoyed if they 
had sold the land in its original state for $50,000 and received $150,000 
cash from the claimant. By the same token, liability will restore the status 
quo ante on both sides. Restitution, again, will leave the defendants none 
the worse for wear. 
The analysis, however, may be more contentious. Assume that while 
the plaintiff mistakenly built a house on the defendants’ property and 
thereby raised its value from $50,000 to $200,000, the landowners never 
intended to sell and, indeed, still hold title. Should an incontrovertible 
benefit be recognized on the basis of a realizable financial gain? The 
defendants could sell the improved parcel for $200,000, pay $150,000 
as restitution to the plaintiff, and use the remaining $50,000 to buy 
a replacement for their original asset. And, if they wish to retain the 
improved property, they could satisfy judgment from other resources. 
While rearranged, the totality of their wealth would be unchanged 
relative to the status quo ante. Instead of holding land worth $50,000 
and other assets worth $150,000, they would hold land worth $200,000. 
For many years, case-law was sparse, the law was unsettled, and 
academic analysis provided the primary point of discussion. As might 
be expected, scholarly opinions vary. At one extreme, the interest in 
autonomy is said to permit recognition of an enrichment only if and when 
a profit has been realized from a non-monetary benefit.68 That approach, 
of course, puts the plaintiff at the defendant’s mercy. A landowner may 
escape liability simply by holding onto the improved property until 
the limitation period has passed or perhaps until the improvement has 
68. Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005) at 61-62; Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution 
revised ed (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) at 121-24. 
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sufficiently depreciated. At the other extreme, the defendant may be 
considered enriched as long as a financial gain can be realized from the 
claimant’s efforts. Most commentators, however, prefer to soften that 
position through the addition of qualifiers. A beneficial service is said to be 
incontrovertible if a financial gain is readily realizable69 or readily realizable 
without undue hardship.70 Depending upon its precise formulation, that 
test may allow a landowner to escape liability if, for instance, the affected 
property is not marketable or genuinely treasured. Accordingly, while the 
underlying premise no longer holds in Canada,71 landowners previously 
were thought to be protected from the risk of restitution by the belief 
that every parcel of land is unique and irreplaceable.72 
Courts elsewhere in the Commonwealth continue to proceed 
cautiously in this area. As will be seen, however, Canadian judges have 
adopted a surprisingly broad test of incontrovertible benefit. While the 
issue has never received the attention that it deserves, an enrichment is 
commonly recognized as long as the plaintiff’s services have increased the 
market value of the defendant’s property. A realizable financial gain, it 
seems, may be sufficient. 
69. Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution, 3d (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011) at 47-49. 
70. A variation on the same theme holds that if recognition of an 
incontrovertible benefit would expose a landowner to intolerable 
hardship, liability may take the form of an equitable lien that is exercisable 
only if and when the defendant sells the relevant asset for an enhanced 
price: Maddaugh & McCamus, supra note 42 at § 3:200.10, § 5:300; 
Gareau Estate (Re)(1995), 9 ETR (2d) 25 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)). 
71. While each parcel of land historically was considered unique and 
irreplaceable, the Supreme Court of Canada has adopted a more flexible 
test: Semelhago, supra note 11; Southcott Estates Inc v Toronto Catholic 
District School Board, 2012 SCC 51. 
72. Goff & Jones traditionally endorsed that view: Goff & Jones, supra note 
45 at 147. The most recent edition of that text, under new authorship, 
now supports a very different approach: C Mitchell, P Mitchell & S 
Watterson, eds, Goff & Jones: The Law of Unjust Enrichment, 8d (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2011) c 5. 
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C. Change of Position: Autonomy Front and Back
The test of enrichment protects a recipient’s autonomy at the time of 
transfer. In order to satisfy the first element of the action in unjust 
enrichment, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant either chose 
to accept the risk of financial responsibility (request, free acceptance) 
or received a benefit for which responsibility cannot be denied 
(incontrovertible benefit). Without more, however, the risk of restitution 
remains. Having been unjustly enriched, entirely innocent recipients may, 
in good faith, become disenriched prior to trial. Suppose, for instance, 
that the defendants, finding their property improved and honestly 
believing that the windfall is theirs to keep, sell the land and distribute 
the additional proceeds to charities that no longer can be identified. If 
the plaintiff then steps forward and the court awards full recovery, the 
defendants will be justifiably aggrieved. Liability will be contrary to their 
freedom of choice. If they had known that they would have to restore the 
value of the claimant’s services, they never would have given to charity. 
Additionally, they will have to deplete other resources (e.g. children’s 
education fund) in order to satisfy a judgment. Restitution will hurt. 
It will leave the defendants with less than they had before the unjust 
enrichment occurred. This cannot be right. 
That problem is solved by protecting the defendants’ autonomy 
front and back. Just as the tests of enrichment respect freedom of choice 
at the moment of receipt, the change of position defence performs the 
same function at the time of trial.73 Liability, ultimately, is reduced to 
the extent that dis-enrichment occurs in good faith before judgment.74 
Consequently, if the defendants donated the full value of their 
enrichment to charity, the plaintiff would recover nothing. Alternatively, 
if the defendants gave away forty per cent of their apparent windfall, 
the plaintiff’s claim would be reduced accordingly. In contrast, the 
defendants would have no defence at all if they spent their enrichment 
73. McInnes, supra note 17 at ch 36. 
74. Mobil Oil Canada Ltd v Storthoaks (Rural Minicipality), [1976] 2 SCR 
147; RBC Dominion Securities Inc v Dawson (1994), 111 DLR (4th) 230 
(NFCA). 
443(2016) 2(2) CJCCL
on rent and groceries; those expenditures would have occurred regardless 
of the unjust enrichment and they do not implicate the defendants’ 
autonomy. The funds that the defendants would have otherwise spent 
on their home can be directed toward the plaintiff instead. The defence 
similarly would be denied if the defendants knew of the plaintiff’s claim 
when they experienced their dis-enrichment. That would be true if they 
gave to charity after being served with a statement of claim. Having made 
an informed decision, they cannot reasonably expect the plaintiff to bear 
the cost of their charitable donation. 
IV. Injustice and Autonomy
For the purposes of unjust enrichment, it would be difficult to overstate 
the significance of the preceding analysis. The tests of enrichment, 
supported by the change of position defence, ensure that restitution never 
hurts relative to the status quo ante. They do so by allowing liability only 
insofar as it is consistent with the defendant’s freedom of choice. That 
proposition also carries an important corollary. Because the recipient’s 
autonomy is protected at the first and fourth stages of inquiry, it need 
not dominate the third. The issue of injustice can — and indeed, must 
— be resolved primarily be reference to considerations other than the 
recipient’s freedom of choice. 
Granted, freedom of choice could be protected in terms of injustice 
rather than enrichment. Liability could be premised upon proof that, 
within a pre-existing relationship, the defendant requested or acquiesced 
in the receipt of a benefit despite knowing that the plaintiff expected 
payment in return. Significantly, however, whereas the nuanced test of 
enrichment sensitively provides protection only to the extent that it is 
required, an injustice-based approach broadly operates on an all-or-
nothing basis. 
Consider a simple situation in which the parties have no relationship 
at the time of transfer. The plaintiff mistakenly improves the defendant’s 
property and thereby raises its value from $10,000 to $15,000. Oblivious 
to the claimant’s mistaken services, the defendant incurs transaction costs 
of $1,000 while selling the improved asset for $15,000, purchases a non-
improved replacement for $10,000, and pockets the remaining $4,000. 
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The plaintiff then discovers the error and sues for restitution. 
The defendant’s autonomy will receive all the protection it requires 
under the enrichment-based approach. Regardless of the fact that the 
parties remained strangers throughout the episode, the defendant 
incontrovertibly is enriched as a result of realizing a $4,000 profit from 
the plaintiff’s services. Liability will very nearly restore the status quo ante. 
The defendant once again will have property worth $10,000; the plaintiff 
will recoup $4,000. Of course, the claimant would prefer to recover 
$5,000, but the additional $1,000 would run contrary to freedom of 
choice. Judgment could be satisfied only if, for instance, the defendant 
used funds that had been earmarked for a brief holiday in the mountains. 
Despite doing nothing wrong, the defendant would be adversely affected. 
Restitution would hurt. 
Now consider the outcome under an injustice-based approach. Since 
the defendant was unaware of the plaintiff throughout, and therefore 
neither requested nor freely accepted the services, liability must be denied 
altogether. The plaintiff will have no means of reversing any part of the 
$5,000 transfer; the defendant will retain both an asset worth $10,000 
and $4,000 in cash. It is difficult to imagine a clearer case of unjust 
enrichment. And yet, for many years, that is precisely the analysis that 
Canadian courts employed. 
A. The Rise in Special Relationships
The modern Canadian law of unjust enrichment began in 1954 when 
Deglman v Guaranty Trust Co75 recognized an independent restitutionary 
claim.76 Understandably, early judgments were somewhat unsophisticated 
and results were decidedly mixed. In cases involving improvements to 
land, it seems that the issues of enrichment and injustice were often 
resolved through unreasoned intuition. 
Estok v Heguy77 is a notorious example. Having apparently purchased 
75. Deglman, supra note 37. 
76. Ibid.
77. (1963), 40 DLR (2d) 88 (BCSC). See also T & E Development Ltd v 
Hoornaert (1978), 78 DLR (3d) 606 (BCSC); Reeve v Abraham (1957), 
22 WWR 429 (ABSC); Phipps v Pickering (1978), 8 BCLR 101 (BCSC).
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a rural property, the plaintiff spread a great deal of manure in preparation 
for planting crops. The purported agreement was then determined to be 
void for lack of a consensus and the land was returned to the defendant. 
Against the ensuing claim for restitution, the defendant insisted that 
since he intended to resume using the parcel for pasture, he had no need 
for the fertilizer. The court nevertheless imposed liability for the value 
of the service. The error in that decision is now easy to see. There was 
no enrichment. Although the manure deposit was an objective benefit 
with market value, the plaintiff could not overcome the plea of subjective 
devaluation. The defendant never chose to bear responsibility. He had 
not requested the service and, because he never had an opportunity to 
reject the manure, there was no question of free acceptance. Nor did 
the fertilizer constitute an incontrovertible benefit. Given the defendant’s 
intended use of the property, he had not been saved a necessary expense, 
and there was no evidence that he was in a position to realize a financial 
gain. 
Republic Resources Ltd v Ballem78 (“Republic Resources”) stands on 
firmer ground. The plaintiff entered onto the defendant’s land under a 
natural gas lease but, as a result of an error, successfully drilled a well 
only after the term had expired. Since it was no longer able to exploit the 
well, the plaintiff sued the defendant in unjust enrichment. It claimed 
that it had conferred an incontrovertible benefit because the defendant 
was either saved the expense of drilling a well or able to realize a financial 
gain whenever the well was put into production. Justice Holmes 
disagreed. In the circumstances, he said, there was no need to drill a 
well and it was impossible to know if or when the capped well might be 
put into profitable production. Thirteen other wells in the area had been 
shut down and the market for natural gas was in precipitous decline. 
Consequently, since the plaintiff had created, at most, an “unascertained 
benefit”,79 restitution was unavailable because it would unfairly override 
the defendant’s autonomy. 
78. [1982] 1 WWR 692 (ABQB) [Republic Resources]. See also Ross Cromarty 
Developments Inc v Arthur Bell Holdings Ltd, [1994] 3 WWR 142 
(BCCA).
79. Republic Resources, supra note 78 at 708.
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1. The Misinterpretation of Nicholson v St Denis 
Despite denying liability on the facts, the court in Republic Resources 
observed that restitution may be awarded, on the basis of an incontrovertible 
benefit, even if the defendant was unaware of the plaintiff’s services at the 
time of performance.80 In that sense, Republic Resources closely resembles 
Nicholson v St Denis81 (“Nicholson”). Unfortunately, the latter case came 
to be misinterpreted with occasionally disastrous results. 
Nicholson itself is an innocuous decision. It began when the defendant 
agreed to sell a property, which contained a building, to Labelle. Though 
the purchaser would not receive title until the price was paid in full, he 
took possession immediately and hired the plaintiff to place siding on the 
building. The job was completed, but as Labelle had become insolvent, 
he could not pay. The plaintiff therefore demanded restitution from the 
defendant who had resumed possession of the parcel. Justice MacKinnon 
rightly dismissed that claim; there was no enrichment. The defendant 
had neither requested nor freely accepted the plaintiff’s services despite 
knowing that he expected payment. Nor did the siding constitute an 
incontrovertible benefit. It did not anticipate a necessary expense and 
there was no evidence to suggest that it raised the property’s market value 
so as to create a realizable financial gain. Moreover, as a Canadian court 
would say today, there was a juristic reason for any enrichment that might 
exist. By entering into a contract and extending credit, the plaintiff took 
the chance that Labelle might not be able to pay.82 Unjust enrichment 
cannot be used to circumvent a contractual allocation of risk.83 
All of this is entirely orthodox. Nicholson’s enduring legacy is found 
instead in Justice MacKinnon’s dicta.84 After surveying cases in which 
restitution had been awarded, he offered a general observation. 
[I]n almost all of the cases the facts established that there was a special relationship 
80. Ibid.
81. (1975), 57 DLR (3d) 699 (Ont CA) [Nicholson]. 
82. The plaintiff similarly became the author of his own misfortune when he 
neglected to secure his rights under the Mechanics’ Lien Act, RSO 1970, c 
267. 
83. McInnes, supra note 17 at ch 12. 
84. Nicholson, supra note 81.
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between the parties, frequently contractual at the outset, which relationship 
would have made it unjust for the defendant to retain the benefit conferred 
on him by the plaintiff ... This relationship in turn is usually, but not always, 
marked by two characteristics, firstly, knowledge of the benefit on the part of 
the defendant, and secondly, either an express or an implied request by the 
defendant for the benefit, or acquiescence in its performance.85 
As long as it is confined to situations involving services, rather than 
money or property, that statement is absolutely true. The explanation 
pertains to the element of enrichment. As previously discussed, services 
are problematic because they can never be restored and because they 
are not equally valued by everyone. There consequently is a danger that 
liability will hurt. The court may effectively dictate an innocent party’s 
allocation of resources. The defendant may have to pay money for a 
service that, while objectively beneficial, was not a spending priority. 
To combat that danger, the law normally requires the plaintiff to prove 
the defendant either requested or freely accepted services with knowledge 
that payment was expected. Significantly, however, MacKinnon J qualified 
his statement. He referred to “almost all of the cases” and said that a 
special relationship “is usually, but not always”, required.86 Exceptions 
do exist. Even if the defendant did not actually choose (actively or 
passively) to bear responsibility for a benefit, the autonomy interest may 
be overcome by the nature of the services themselves. That is true if the 
plaintiff provided the defendant with an incontrovertible benefit. 
MacKinnon J supported his position by citing Greenwood v Bennett.87 
The plaintiff purchased a badly damaged Jaguar and spent considerable 
time and money on repairs. In fact, although the claimant had acted 
in good faith, the car previously had been stolen from the defendant 
and run into the ground. After the police intervened and returned 
the vehicle to its rightful owner, the plaintiff sued for the value of the 
mistaken improvements. Although the other members of the Court of 
85. Ibid at 701-702 [emphasis added]. 
86. Nicholson, supra note 81 at para 8.
87. Greenwood, supra note 44. See now Benedetti v Sawiris, [2013] UKSC 
50 (“there are circumstances in which the receipt of a service may call for 
restitution of its monetary value even if the receipt was involuntary” at 
para 113). 
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Appeal recognized a passive claim of equitable set-off, Lord Denning 
held that the mistaken improver was entitled to restitution of an unjust 
enrichment. Stated in more modern language, the defendant obtained 
an enrichment when he sold the Jaguar, in its improved state, for an 
increased price. By realizing a financial gain from the plaintiff’s efforts, 
the defendant incontrovertibly was benefitted.88 
A careful reading of the dicta in Nicholson reveals a sound proposition: 
in the absence of a “special relationship” that involves either request or free 
acceptance, the defendant is not enriched, and consequently cannot be 
held liable, unless the plaintiff conferred a benefit that, by its very nature, 
is incontrovertible. Soon enough, however, the case was misinterpreted 
as support for a very different proposition: a mistaken improver of 
property must demonstrate a pre-existing “special relationship” with the 
defendant in order to prove that the impugned transfer was unjust, and 
hence, reversible. A misplaced desire to protect innocent recipients from 
unwanted obligations elevated the concept of a “special relationship” to 
the status of an “essential nexus”, the “sine qua non of success”,89 without 
which a restitutionary claim for services rendered must fail. 
Because it effectively insists that the autonomy interest can be 
satisfied only through an actual exercise of choice, the purported “special 
relationship” rule precludes recovery any time the plaintiff must prove 
an incontrovertible benefit in order to overcome the defendant’s plea 
of subjective devaluation. An entire category of legitimate claims is 
placed beyond the reach of the action in unjust enrichment. The result, 
predictably, is injustice. Undeserved windfalls are left where they fall. 
Olchowy v McKay90 (“Olchowy”) perfectly illustrates that possibility. 
Mistakenly believing that he had purchased a parcel of land, the plaintiff 
spent $3,889 clearing it of rocks and planting canola seed. The defendants, 
88. Canadian courts have applied the same reasoning in cases dealing with 
land: Salna v Awad, 2011 ABCA 20; Sanderson v Campsall, 2000 BCSC 
583; Maggio Flooring Ltd v Gipson, [2011] OJ No 1751 (Sup Ct J)(QL); 
Park Lane Ranch Ltd v Fleetwood Village Holdings (Phase II) Ltd (1980), 
17 RPR 35 (BCSC).
89. McLaren v The Queen, [1984] 2 FC 899 at 905 (FCTD). 
90. [1996] 1 WWR 36 (SKQB) [Olchowy]. 
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who were aware of the claimant’s error from the outset, cynically sat 
silent until the work was done. They then purchased the property for 
a price that did not account for the crop and harvested 600 bushels of 
canola worth $4,386. The court agreed that the plaintiff had conferred 
an incontrovertible benefit to the extent that the defendants realized 
a financial gain from the plaintiff’s services. Restitution nevertheless 
was denied on the grounds that the defendants had not requested the 
enrichment, and, because they did not own the property when the 
services were provided, they were not subject to the obligations inherent 
in the doctrines of free acceptance or proprietary estoppel.91 In the end, 
they were literally allowed to reap what the plaintiff had sown.92 
Olchowy was a remarkable case, but the court’s analysis was anything 
but. Beginning in 1975, restitution claimants routinely were required to 
91. Ibid. Though harsh, Olchowy might be defended on the basis that, by 
virtue of their purchase, the defendants acquired an absolute right to 
both the land and the crop growing on it. The judgment, in fact, contains 
reasons along those lines. Significantly, however, the plaintiff did not 
dispute ownership of the canola. His claim pertained to its value. And, 
in any event, Justice McLellan’s reasoning is mirrored in countless other 
decisions that are not complicated by questions of title. For a discussion 
of the intersection of unjust enrichment and Torrens indefeasibility, see 
McInnes, supra note 17 at ch 26.
92. The plaintiff’s only relief, for $428, stemmed from the fact that 
the clearing of rocks constituted a “lasting improvement” under 
Saskatchewan’s betterment legislation. See Improvements Under Mistake of 
Title Act, RSS 1978, c I-1, s 2. 
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establish “special relationships”.93 And as long as that practice continued, 
the action in unjust enrichment very often would deny relief to those 
who improved land. 
V. Restitution for Improvements
Late into the twentieth century, liability was unlikely if one improved 
another’s land. Leaving aside betterment statutes and passive rights of set-
off, proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment provided the best hope 
of relief, but both were subject to very similar limitations. Even though 
Canadian courts have distanced themselves from the “five probanda” in 
favour of more relaxed criteria, proprietary estoppel continues to require 
proof that services were rendered in reliance upon the landowner’s active 
or passive representation that the claimant enjoyed, or would acquire, 
some interest in the affected property. The action in unjust enrichment 
was doubly restricted. As courts refused to recognize incontrovertible 
benefits in connection with land, an enrichment could be established only 
by means of a request or free acceptance. And on the issue of injustice, 
liability was said to depend upon the existence of a “special relationship”. 
The situation today is dramatically different. Proprietary estoppel has 
93. Jones v Craig, [2009] OJ No 2365 (Sup Ct J)(QL); Grant Design Group 
Inc v Neustaedter 2008 MBQB 336; Litemor Distributors (Edmonton) Ltd 
v Midwest Furnishings and Supplies Ltd, 2007 ABQB 23; Agrium Inc v 
Chubb Insurance Co of Canada, 2002 ABQB 495; Nu-Way Kitchens Ltd 
v Smallwood (2000), 187 Nfld & PEIR 251 (SC); Elmford Construction 
Co v South Winston Properties Inc (1999), 45 OR (3d) 588 (Sup Ct J); JE 
Weaver Enterprises Ltd v Hardy (1998), 44 CLR (2d) 243 (NSSC); Turf 
Masters Landscaping Ltd v TAG Developments Ltd (1995), 143 NSR (2d) 
275 (CA); Robert D Sutherland Architects Ltd v Montykola Investments Inc 
(1995), 142 NSR (2d) 137 (SC); Alyea v South Waterloo Edgar Insurance 
Brokers Ltd, (1993) 50 CCEL 266 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)); cf. MacLellan v 
Morash, 2006 NSSC 101 (lack of “special relationship” fatal to legal claim 
for quantum meruit, but irrelevant to equitable claim in unjust enrichment 
for “compensation”) [Morash]. 
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lost its traditional status as the primary source of liability.94 Of course, that 
claim remains relevant if the plaintiff seeks to do something other than 
reverse a transfer, or if the facts do not fall within the restitutionary action. 
In the majority of cases, however, the focus falls upon unjust enrichment. 
Even those situations that historically would have triggered a plea of 
proprietary estoppel are now commonly addressed exclusively in terms 
of unwarranted transfers.95 That change is a function of two fundamental 
developments within the Canadian law of unjust enrichment. Together, 
they facilitate liability, even if, prior to performance, the plaintiff had no 
contact with the defendant. 
A. Readily Realizable Gains
The first development is the remarkable expansion of incontrovertible 
benefits. If the landowner did not actually choose to accept the risk of 
financial responsibility, the plaintiff must prove that the benefit itself was 
undeniable. And unless the services anticipated a necessary expense, that 
benefit must pertain to the realization of a financial gain. 
There should be little scope for debate if the defendant actually did 
turn the plaintiff’s contributions into cash.96 That was true in Sanderson 
94. In practice, the detrimental act that lies at the heart of proprietary 
estoppel often entails an enrichment to the landowner, such that the 
claimant can satisfy both heads of liability as they are now formulated. 
See Idle-0, supra note 30; Clarke, supra note 35; Schumacher Estate, supra 
note 35. Nevertheless, because it does not require a beneficial transfer, 
proprietary estoppel may provide help to those whom unjust enrichment 
turns away: Schwark Estate v Cutting (2008) 46 ETR (3d) 120 (Ont Sup 
Ct J) reversed in 2010 ONCA 61; Brownlee, supra note 35; cf. Cowderoy, 
supra note 9. 
95. No 151 Cathedral Ventures Ltd v Gartrell, 2003 BCSC 1801; Sherbeth, 
supra note 53; Stewart v Stewart, 2014 BCSC 766; cf. Sabey, supra note 10 
(disputing lower court’s proprietary estoppel analysis and returning parties 
to trial level for consideration of restitutionary claim). 
96. Port Abino Association v Lee 73 ACWS (3d) 44 (Ont Ct J (Gen Div)); cf. 
Olchowy, supra note 90. See also Spicer v Middleton (Town), 2014 NSSC 
66; Pekurar v Hummingbird Farms Ltd, [2015] OJ No 378 (Sup Ct J)
(QL). 
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v Campsall.97 While sharing possession of a parcel that belonged to her 
husband’s parents, a woman affixed a mobile home to the land and made 
other improvements. When her marriage ended and she was removed 
from the property, she sued in unjust enrichment. Although the parents 
argued that they “just wanted the home — which they do not consider 
an improvement — off the land”,98 they rented out the unit, which was 
worth $34,000, for $600 per month. The court recognized an enrichment 
accordingly. Conrad v Feldbar Construction Co Ltd99 came to a similar 
conclusion on the enrichment issue. The defendant owned an isolated 
property in an undeveloped area of Toronto. The plaintiff constructed an 
arterial roadway that serviced all of the properties in the area, including 
the defendant’s. The defendant then sold his parcel for a price that was 
substantially inflated by reason of the improvement. He was held liable 
for those additional profits. 
Far more remarkably, Canadian courts now frequently allow the first 
element of the action in unjust enrichment to be satisfied by proof that 
the plaintiff’s services created a realizable financial gain by increasing 
the market value of the defendant’s property.100 In Love v Schumacher 
Estate101 (“Schumacher Estate”), the defendant owned an unused cottage 
that he allowed the plaintiff and her daughters to occupy beginning in 
1985. Over the next twenty-five years, the claimant spent approximately 
$100,000 on repairs and improvements, thereby raising the property’s 
97. 2000 BCSC 583. 
98. Ibid at para 8.
99. (2004), 70 OR (3d) 298 (Ont Sup Ct J). The court’s attempt to explain 
its decision in terms of free acceptance is fatally undermined by the fact 
that the defendant expressly informed the plaintiff, even before the work 
commenced, that he did not wish to contribute to the cost of the roadway. 
The defendant’s enrichment must be explained instead by reference to the 
profit that he realized from the sale of the improved parcel. 
100. Idle-0, supra note 30; Clarke, supra note 35; Dutertre, supra note 29; 
Murphy, supra note 29; Simonin Estate v Simonin, 2010 ONCA 900 
[Simonin Estate]; cf. Birch Paving & Excavating Co v Clark, [2014] OJ 
No 1637 (Sup Ct J)(QL)(enrichment not proven because “there is no 
evidence supporting any increase in the value of the property” as a result 
of the plaintiff’s services at para 64) [Birch Paving].
101. Schumacher Estate, supra note 35.
453(2016) 2(2) CJCCL
value from $35,000 to $174,000. She did so in part because the defendant 
promised, in 1993, that she would receive legal title on his death. In 
2010, however, he executed a new will that gave his entire estate to his 
son. In the ensuing litigation, Justice Tausenfreund upheld claims in both 
proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment. The issue of enrichment 
was resolved on the simple basis that the “value of the cottage property 
increased over the years based on the plaintiff’s time, her labour, and her 
financial resources”.102 
Servello v Servello103 (“Servello”) involved a large immigrant family 
that successfully developed a business that operated out of a property 
that also contained their home. The youngest son, working alongside 
his father, substantially enlarged the onsite workshop, but subsequently 
became estranged from his family. In the litigation that followed, he sued 
for both proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment. Despite ultimately 
rejecting both “equitable” claims because the son’s behaviour during the 
squabble left him with “unclean hands”, Justice Koke did agree that the 
parents had been enriched. Having valued the son’s “contribution to the 
workshop … to be approximately $68,133.66”, he observed that while 
“the overall value of the property” had not necessarily “increased by this 
much, it still represents an enrichment”.104 
MacLellan v Morash105 (“Morash”) similarly arose from a familial 
dispute. Having long allowed her seven children recreational use of an 
island that she owned, an elderly woman also permitted one son, named 
Ronald, to operate a lobster business from the property. He accordingly 
devoted more than $20,000 and 3500 man-hours to the construction 
102. Ibid at para 40. 
103. Servello, supra note 35. 
104. Ibid at para 105. See Servello v Servello, 2015 ONCA 434 at para 7, 
where, while affirming the decision below, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
said that there was “no evidence that the property increased in value as a 
result of the [son’s contributions]”. In fact, Koke J said that there was “no 
evidence … to indicate how much the value of the property has increased” 
in Servello, supra note 35 at 116 [emphasis added]. Despite the difference, 
both statements are consistent with the recognition of an enrichment on 
the basis of increased value. 
105. Morash, supra note 93. 
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of a “fish shed”, as well as a causeway and a bridge that linked the island 
to the mainland. That connection both furthered his economic interests 
and made it much easier for family members to access the property. 
Against that backdrop, the mother’s decision to devise title to two other 
children understandably enraged Ronald, who tore down the bridge and 
blocked up the causeway with machinery. Even after that fit of pique, 
however, the remaining improvements enhanced the island’s value by 
some $300,000. Ronald consequently was entitled to relief. Although 
his claim for proprietary estoppel failed, because his acts were a product 
of his own initiative rather than any promise of title from his mother, his 
plea of unjust enrichment was successful. Justice MacLellan considered 
it “clear that the owner of the island” was enriched. Just as the “family 
started making considerably more use” of the island once the causeway 
was in place, the property became “much more valuable” once it could 
“be reached without using a boat”.106 
Sherbeth v Sherbeth107 (“Sherbeth”), the final case for consideration, 
provides the most robust illustration of the incontrovertible benefit 
doctrine. After the plaintiff announced his desire to start a construction 
business, his father offered the use of a section of land for that purpose. 
The plaintiff then spent almost $100,000 building business premises. The 
situation predictably turned ugly when the father transferred title to the 
plaintiff’s brother. And when the brother demanded vacant possession, 
the plaintiff countered with a claim in unjust enrichment. Against 
that restitutionary claim, the brother explained that he had no use for 
the improvements, which he intended to remove. Justice Menzies was 
prepared to accept that seemingly irrational threat, “not because there is 
no value in the building and yard site but rather because [the brother] 
would wish to remove any reminder of [the plaintiff]”.108 He nevertheless 
found that the plaintiff’s services “represent an incontrovertible benefit 
to the [d]efendants even if they do not wish to take advantage of it”.109 
It might be different, he said, if the claimant left “behind some type of 
106. Ibid at para 74. 
107. Sherbeth, supra note 53. 
108. Ibid at para 24. 
109. Ibid.
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structure that could serve no useful purpose to the [d]efendants on their 
farming operation”.110 On the facts, however, the plaintiff constructed 
“a yardsite which could be productively used in a farming operation or 
at very least could be sold or rented to realize on its value, whether the 
[d]efendants elect to take advantage of it or not”.111 In the absence of any 
juristic reason, that enrichment entitled the plaintiff to recover the value 
of the improvement. 
1. A Step Too Far? 
On reading the preceding cases, those who champion the cause of unjust 
enrichment are apt to echo Lord Mansfield’s admonition: “I am a great 
friend to the [restitutionary] action … and therefore I am not for stretching, 
lest I should endanger it”.112 The crucial question, it will be recalled, is 
whether the plaintiff can overcome the right of subjective devaluation by 
demonstrating that liability is consistent with the defendant’s freedom of 
choice.113 The mere receipt of an objective benefit must not be enough. 
To hold otherwise is to potentially impose an intolerable burden upon 
an innocent party. Irreplaceable property, having been improved without 
request or acquiescence, may have to be sacrificed for the purpose of 
satisfying judgment. That is why scholarly opinion, even at its broadest, 
formulates the relevant branch of incontrovertible benefit in terms of 
readily realizable financial gains. The restitutionary interest is reconcilable 
with the landowner’s autonomy only to the extent that the claimant’s 
contribution can be treated as if it consisted of a transfer of money. 
At a glance, however, it is clear that Canadian courts have gone 
somewhat further. Granted, Schumacher Estate arguably fell within the 
spirit of the doctrine.114 The plaintiff had greatly improved the property 
while enjoying exclusive possession for a quarter century; the defendant 
had no connection to the cottage before inheriting it from his father at 
the end of that period. In the circumstances, the court’s decision to allow 
110. Ibid at para 27. 
111. Ibid.
112. Weston v Downes (1778), 1 Doug KB 23 (Eng) at 24.
113. Discussed above at Part III.B. 
114. Schumacher Estate, supra note 35. 
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the claimant to remain in possession for another fifteen years does not 
seem an intolerable infringement of the titleholder’s rights. Servello was 
more problematic. Restitution would have created genuine hardship.115 
Given the degree of acrimony within the family, as well as the defendant’s 
residence on the property, shared use was not feasible; given the value 
of the improvements, in personam relief would have constituted a 
substantial debt. As a result, the court, presumably, was much relieved to 
be able to (speciously)116 invoke the clean hands doctrine and make the 
case go away. That option was not available in Morash, which similarly 
involved an ugly family dispute.117 Since the squabbling siblings “simply 
[could not] live together as joint owners”, restitution took the form of a 
personal judgment for $65,000.118 While the titleholders’ financial status 
was not reported, most people do not have that kind of money close at 
hand and it is easy to imagine that the defendants were compelled to sell 
or mortgage the affected property in order to satisfy the judgment. The 
island, which several generations of the family had enjoyed for decades, 
undoubtedly held much more than monetary value. Is the law of unjust 
enrichment ever justified in effectively requiring innocent parties to 
sacrifice prized possessions? 
Even those who agree with the decision in Morash119 may question 
Sherbeth.120 Acting entirely for his own benefit, the plaintiff dug down to 
bedrock, laid foundations, and built his business premises on an otherwise 
undeveloped piece of land. His father, who owned the parcel at the outset, 
permitted that work to be done, but had no use for the improvements. 
More dramatically, his brother, as successor in title, intended to exercise 
his right of exclusive occupation in order to remove the structures and 
allow nature to resume its course. The court nevertheless recognized an 
enrichment and imposed liability on the ground that — regardless of 
what a landowner wishes to do, or is likely to do, or can afford to do 
115. Servello, supra note 35. 
116. Discussed in Part VI, below. 
117. Morash, supra note 93 at para 87. 
118. Ibid at para 87. 
119. Morash, supra note 93.
120. Sherbeth, supra note 53. 
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— the ability to realize a financial gain constitutes an incontrovertible 
benefit.121 
The branch of incontrovertible benefit governing the realization of 
financial gains is inherently controversial. There is no singularly correct 
way to formulate the doctrine and, until the Supreme Court of Canada 
settles the issue, opinions will vary as widely as individual judicial 
philosophies. Sherbeth falls well to one side of that continuum. Without 
any discussion of the debate, Justice Menzies overwhelmingly privileged 
the plaintiff’s restitution interest above the defendant’s autonomy interest. 
Unless he had a substantial sum of money that he was willing to allocate 
to the judgment, the titleholder was at serious risk of losing control over 
his own property. And, while Canadian law may eventually regard such 
risks as an acceptable cost of reversing unjust enrichments, it is worth 
observing that Sherbeth raises precisely those concerns that traditionally 
inhibited courts from entertaining such claims. 
B. The Decline of Special Relationships
While Canadian courts continue to struggle with incontrovertible 
benefits, they largely have overcome the troublesome doctrine of “special 
121. Several aspects of the decision may appear to hedge that proposition. 
First, the defendants surprisingly “admit[ted] liability … but dispute[d] 
the Plaintiff’s entitlement to any relief ”, ibid at para 1. The existence 
of an enrichment, however, was not treated as a foregone conclusion. 
Justice Menzies proceeded as though the elements of the action in 
unjust enrichment were contested. Second, the father initially had given 
the plaintiff some assurance that he eventually would receive title if he 
developed the land. Nevertheless, while that fact undoubtedly coloured 
the judge’s perception of the dispute, it was logically irrelevant to the 
recognition of a realizable financial gain. Interestingly, notwithstanding 
the father’s “promise”, the plaintiff did not sue for proprietary estoppel. 
He relied exclusively on unjust enrichment. Third, the court referred to 
the defendants’ “wrongful actions” and said that the “object of unjust 
enrichment is to compensate the Plaintiff for the losses he has suffered”, 
ibid at para 52. Of course, if the facts did truly call for the reparation 
of wrongful losses, then any comments regarding restitutionary benefits 
would be dicta. Notwithstanding occasional terminological errors, 
however, the court properly focused on the issue of unjust enrichment. 
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relationship” that needlessly restricted the scope of restitutionary relief 
for a quarter century. Granted, old habits occasionally die hard. The 
purported rule of “bilaterality”122 — a misinterpretation of Nicholson123 
— continues to be expressed from time to time.124 Beginning in the 
late 1990s, however, judges increasingly employed a model of unjust 
enrichment that is capable of imposing liability for unsolicited services 
between strangers.125 In Wacky’s Carpet & Floor Centre v Joseph,126 
for instance, Justice Edwards revisited Nicholson’s dicta and correctly 
observed that while the concept of “special relationship” is a “thread that 
runs through the jurisprudence”, it is not “an additional burden that 
must be met by a claimant”.127 “The absence of a special relationship”, 
he explained, “will not necessarily defeat a claim”.128 Likewise, in Bond 
Development Corp v Esquimalt (Township),129 Justice Huddart focused 
on the actual message of Nicholson before stressing that, given the 
evolution of the action in unjust enrichment, it is no longer appropriate 
to determine rights of recovery on the basis of some vague principle of 
“special relationship”.130
Huddart J undoubtedly was right in regarding the decline of “special 
relationships” as a mark of maturity. When MacKinnon J first formulated 
that doctrine in Nicholson, the Canadian law of unjust enrichment was 
under-developed and poorly understood.131 There was no Canadian text 
on point and the three-part cause of action had yet to be authoritatively 
122. Campbell v Campbell (1999), 173 DLR (4th) 270 (Ont CA) at paras 32-
34 [Campbell].
123. Nicholson, supra note 81. 
124. J Lepera Contracting Inc v Royal Timbers Inc, 2012 ONSC 271 at para 83; 
Skibinski v Community Living British Columbia, 2010 BCSC 1500 at para 
192; Murphy, supra note 29 at para 86; cf. Birch Paving, supra note 100.
125. Clearwater Well Drilling Ltd v Wile (1996), 148 NSR (2d) 306 (SC)
(restitution “may be granted in an exceptional case where no special 
relationship exists between the parties” at 309); Gidney, supra note 43. 
126. 2006 NSSC 353. 
127. Ibid at para 12.
128. Ibid at para 15.
129. 2006 BCCA 248. 
130. Ibid at at para 47.
131. Nicholson, supra note 81.
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articulated. Mistakes were inevitable and, given the traditional fear that 
restitution may threaten individual autonomy, courts understandably 
erred on the side of caution. However, by the turn of the twenty-first 
century, the situation had changed dramatically. Courts at the highest level 
routinely resolved restitutionary disputes, a substantial body of literature 
served the subject, and the profession had grown comfortable with the 
governing principles. As unjust enrichment evolved and expanded to its 
natural dimensions, it no longer had any need for “special relationships”. 
Relief rightly became available between strangers. 
That development gained additional impetus in 2004, when the test 
of restitutionary injustice was fundamentally reformulated. Garland v 
Consumers’ Gas Co132 (“Garland”) provided an opportunity to resolve a 
long-standing debate regarding the precise basis upon which transfers 
are reversed.133 Within common law systems, the reason for restitution 
consists of an unjust factor that positively justifies recovery (e.g. mistake, 
compulsion). Civilian systems, in contrast, generally award restitution 
in the absence of any juristic reason for a transfer (e.g. contract, donative 
intent). Though they usually come to similar conclusions, those two tests 
proceed in opposite directions. Whereas the former looks at the plaintiff 
and says, “[n]o restitution unless … ”, the latter looks at the defendant 
and says, “[r]estitution unless … ”. For complicated reasons that lie 
beyond this paper,134 the Supreme Court of Canada decided to embrace 
the juristic reason approach.135 Anomalously within the common law 
world, the Canadian action in unjust enrichment now operates on a 
civilian model. 
Though the concept could be accommodated within either approach, 
a “special relationship” provides a positive reason for the claimant’s 
132. Garland, supra note 37. 
133. Ibid.
134. McInnes, supra note 17 at ch 4 II-III. 
135. The language, though not substance, of juristic reasons was introduced in 
Rathwell v Rathwell, [1978] 2 SCR 436 at 455, and adopted in Pettkus, 
supra note 14 at 848. See also Lauréat Giguère Inc v Cie Immobilière Viger 
Ltée, [1977] 2 SCR 67 at 77 which addressed, on appeal from Quebec, 
the civilian action de in rem verso. See now art 1493 CCQ. 
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recovery and therefore fits more naturally within a test of unjust factors.136 
In contrast, a “special relationship” has no real role to play within a test 
of juristic reasons. If the parties shared a “special relationship” insofar as 
the impugned transfer was undertaken pursuant to, say, a contractual 
obligation, then there will be a legal explanation for the defendant’s 
enrichment and restitution will be denied. And if the parties shared a 
“special relationship” that fell outside the categories of juristic reason, 
then it is irrelevant. 
1. Claims Between Strangers
By its very nature, the decline of “special relationships” is difficult to 
prove positively. A few judges have expressly disavowed the purported 
rule, but recent decisions dealing with unsolicited improvements to land 
are notable for what they do not say. While the late twentieth century 
cases were dominated by talk of “special relationships”, Canadian courts 
now routinely proceed simply by reference to the three-part cause of 
action. 
That development can be illustrated by re-visiting Campbell v 
Campbell 137 (“Campbell”), the decision that provided the most thorough 
attempt to justify the supposed need for “special relationships”. Gordon 
Campbell operated a dairy farm for many years. Shortly before his 
death in 1977, he transferred his milk quota, which was essential to 
136. The point is complicated by the fact that Garland did not adopt a classic 
civilian test of juristic reasons. The Supreme Court of Canada instead 
formulated a two-stage analysis. The first stage requires the plaintiff to 
disprove the “established categories” of juristic reason — i.e. contract, 
donative intent, disposition of law, and “other valid common law, 
equitable or statutory obligations”. Satisfaction of that burden raises a 
prima facie right to restitution, but the defendant is entitled to rebut 
that presumption by proving the existence of a “residual” juristic reason. 
That second stage of inquiry is guided by “all of the circumstances of the 
transaction”, but focuses on “two factors: the reasonable expectations of 
the parties, and public policy considerations”. See Garland, supra note 37 
at para 44. Rules regarding “special relationships” could be accommodated 
within either of those factors. 
137. Campbell, supra note 122. 
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the business, to his sons, John and Robert. His land and equipment, 
in contrast, passed to his widow, Laura, under his will. The survivors 
continued the business. The two sons assumed responsibility for day-
to-day operations while the widow permitted use of her property and 
contributed her bookkeeping and household services. By 1988, the farm 
required modernization in order to remain economically viable. John 
and Robert accordingly replaced several pieces of equipment, renovated 
an existing barn, and constructed a new barn. The farm functioned in 
its improved state for three more years until Robert’s death in 1991. At 
that point, John sold the milk quota to a third party and informed his 
mother that she no longer would be able to sell milk to the marketing 
board. Shortly thereafter, he and Robert’s executor sued Laura for the 
restitutionary value of the improvements.138 Having accepted an expert 
opinion that the farm’s value continued to be enhanced as a result of the 
brothers’ contributions, Justice Kent imposed liability for $151,200. 
That decision was overturned by the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
Justice Borins stressed that “the absence of Laura’s consent to the … 
improvements to the farm — indeed, the absence of any evidence that 
she expressly requested her sons to undertake this work — is the essential 
reason why the … claim … should fail”.139 Rephrasing his reasons as a 
general proposition, he baldly stated that “the law of unjust enrichment 
138. The plaintiffs also sought, in the alternative, a declaration that the farm 
assets were partnership property held equally between themselves and the 
widow. That claim was dismissed at trial and not pursued on appeal. 
139. Campbell, supra note 122 at para 26. 
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refuses recovery for unrequested benefits”.140 Of course, that simply 
is not true. The absence of a “bilateral” relationship, marked by the 
recipient’s request or free acceptance, merely means that the plaintiff 
must show that the benefit, by its very nature, is incontrovertible and 
consequently consistent with the defendant’s autonomy. On the facts of 
140. Ibid at para 34. Though typically traced to Nicholson, supra note 81 and 
presented in terms of “special relationships”, Justice Borins JA drew his 
demand for “bilaterality” from an academic source: Abraham Drassinower, 
“Unrequested Benefits in the Law of Restitution” (1998) 48:4 University 
of Toronto Law Journal 459 at 460. See ibid at para 36. Regardless 
of the details, however, the purported requirement was irreconcilable 
with the rules of restitutionary liability as a matter of policy, principle, 
and historical precedent. The court similarly was led astray on another 
fundamental point, Campbell, supra note 122 at para 26. Borins JA stated 
the issue of juristic reasons should be treated as a “narrow question of 
fairness as between the parties. Courts should consider whether, having 
regard to the particular circumstances giving rise to an enrichment and 
to subsequent events, it is fair for the defendant to retain the benefit”, 
quoting MM Litman, “The Emergence of Unjust Enrichment as a Cause 
of Action and the Remedy of Constructive Trust” (1988) 26:3 Alberta 
Law Review 407 at 451. That conception of injustice invites precisely the 
sort of “palm tree justice” that nearly proved fatal to unjust enrichment 
during the early part of the twentieth century. See Holt v Markham, 
[1923] 1 KB 505 (Eng) at 513 (rejecting “well-meaning sloppiness of 
thought” as a basis of liability); See Beblow, supra note 50 (Of course, the 
restitutionary action is not actually “a device for doing whatever may seem 
fair between the parties” at 987).
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Campbell, liability might have been refused on other grounds,141 but the 
improvements undertaken by the defendant’s sons increased the value of 
her farm and provided her with a realizable financial gain.142 And once 
an enrichment and a corresponding deprivation have been established, a 
transfer is reversible as long as it occurred without juristic reason. 
Significantly, all of that would hold true even if the parties did 
not share a pre-existing relationship. Cases of that sort understandably 
are rare. It is easy enough to imagine a person acquiring possession 
141. Campbell, supra note 122 at para 11. When the issue first arose, Laura 
was “[n]ot agreeable” with her sons’ plans to upgrade the farm. Because 
they “just ignored her and went ahead”, their ensuing claim might have 
been barred on the grounds of officiousness. The law of unjust enrichment 
does not protect those who knowingly foist themselves on others. The 
plaintiffs resisted that conclusion by arguing that Laura’s objections were 
a function of the fact that “her mind was so screwy”. And indeed, given 
“her impaired state of mind”, the court was “doubtful” that she was able 
“to properly acquiesce in what was taking place”; see Campbell, supra 
note 122 at para 38. Even if that was true, however, relief might have 
been refused on the basis that the defendant had received an incidental 
benefit from the claimants’ self-interested acts. As Borins JA interpreted 
the situation, the brothers undertook the improvements because dairy 
production was their business. While their mother had stopped drawing 
an income several years earlier, their livelihood depended upon the 
efficient operation of the farm. They knowingly had acted without any 
expectation of compensation other than the profits generated by the 
business. See also Simonin Estate, supra note 100; cf. Morash, supra note 
93 (relief available if plaintiff motivated only partially by self-interest). 
The concepts of officiousness and incidental benefit may be incorporated 
within Garland’s test of juristic reasons, but they are better addressed at 
a fourth stage of analysis, dealing with bars and defences: Mcinnes, supra 
note 17 at chs 41-42. 
142. Campbell, supra note 122. So too, by replacing old equipment and 
building a new barn, the claimants arguably discharged a factually 
necessary expense. Without those improvements, the family business was 
not viable. 
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of a chattel and improving it without any knowledge of the owner.143 
Because it stays in one place, land does not readily lend itself to similar 
treatment. Restitutionary claims nevertheless may arise, outside of 
“special relationships”, if, for instance, the plaintiff improved a parcel 
under a mistake of title.144 Fortunately, the Canadian principle of unjust 
enrichment is now sufficiently mature to resolve such claims without the 
need for extraneous requirements. 
VI. Conclusion
This paper is misleading in one respect. Its title suggests that improvements 
to land are remedied primarily, if not exclusively, in equity. As explained 
in the introduction, that largely was true in the past. Leaving aside the 
law’s ability to reduce a landowner’s right to mesne profits by the value 
of improvements provided by a bona fide trespasser, the only hope 
for relief was found in equity’s passive right of set-off or its doctrine 
of proprietary estoppel. Since the turn of the century, however, the 
situation has changed dramatically. The criteria for proprietary estoppel 
have been relaxed, but much more importantly, the action in unjust 
enrichment has been allowed to operate according to its own logic. 
The concept of “special relationships”, initially adopted in a misguided 
attempt to protect the autonomy of innocent recipients, increasingly 
has been abandoned. Canadian courts have recognized that, regardless 
of any request or acquiescence, beneficial services may incontrovertibly 
enrich the defendant, and, in the absence of any juristic reason, trigger a 
restitutionary obligation. The principle of unjust enrichment sufficiently 
143. Gidney, supra note 43; Mayne v Kidd, [1951] 2 DLR 652 (Sask CA); 
Ings v Industrial Acceptance Corp Ltd, [1962] OR 454 (CA); Greenwood, 
supra note 44; Robinson, supra note 43; cf. Webb, supra note 44; Munro v 
Willmott, [1949] 1 KB 295 (Eng); Mutungih v Bokun (2006), 40 CCLT 
(3d) 313 (Ont Sup Ct J).
144. Even when the parties are aware of each other, they are not joined by 
a “special relationship” or “bilaterality” unless the defendant requests 
or receives beneficial services with knowledge that the plaintiff expects 
something in return. As a result, the parties effectively are strangers if, for 
instance, a purchaser makes improvements after taking early occupation 
under a contract that is later struck down: see Nicholson, supra note 81. 
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protects freedom of choice and the addition of extraneous requirements 
like “bilaterality” merely serves to defeat legitimate claims. 
All of that would seem to reinforce the title of this paper: 
improvements to land are remedied in equity through the action in 
unjust enrichment. In truth, however, there is nothing inherently 
equitable about restitutionary relief. Indeed, the vast bulk of the subject 
now known as “unjust enrichment” derives from the ancient courts of 
law, rather than chancery.145 Canadian judges come close to recognizing 
that fact when they address improvements to land in terms of quantum 
meruit, which, as one of the common counts under the writ of indebitatus 
assumpsit, operated in the courts of law.146 Nevertheless, although the 
same error seldom is seen in other common law jurisdictions,147 most 
Canadian lawyers believe that the whole of unjust enrichment is equitable 
in origin and nature.148 The explanation for that belief is unclear, but there 
is simply no debate on the central point.149 As with tort and contract, 
unjust enrichment is an essentially legal concept. Equity typically enters 
into the picture, as needed, at the margins. For instance, just as a tortious 
nuisance may attract injunctive relief and a contract to sell land may 
trigger specific performance, an unjust enrichment may be remedied by 
145. McInnes, supra note 17 at 31-54.
146. Idle-0, supra note 30 at para 79; McLeod, supra note 53. 
147. Sinclair v Brougham, [1914] AC 398 (HL)(“the notion that [the 
restitutionary action] was an equitable action” has been “exploded” — it 
“was not devised by the Court of Chancery, nor was it applied there either 
in form or in substance” at 454-456); Roxborough v Rothmans of Pall Mall 
Australia Ltd (2001), 208 CLR 516 (HCA)(“a perfectly legal action” at 
562); American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law Third: Restitution 
and Unjust Enrichment (St. Paul: American Law Institute, 2011), 
Comment A (warning against “the common misperception that liabilities 
or remedies described in terms of ‘unjust enrichment’ are necessarily 
equitable in origin” at § 4). 
148. Cf. Communities Economic Development Fund v Canadian Pickles Corp, 
[1991] 3 SCR 388 (the restitutionary action “does not lie in equity” at 
415); Federated Co-Operatives Ltd v Canada, 2001 FCA 23 at para 5; 
Michelin Tires (Canada) Ltd v Canada, 2001 FCA 145. 
149. Mitchell McInnes, “The Equitable Action in Unjust Enrichment” (2007) 
45:2 Canadian Business Law Journal 253. 
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a proprietary form of restitution (e.g. a trust or a lien) if a simple money 
judgment would be inadequate. While the response may be equitable, 
the underlying cause of action generally operates in law.150 
Nearly 150 years after the Judicature Acts fused the administration 
of law and equity, pedigree should be largely irrelevant.151 Within the 
context of this paper, however, it bears mention for one reason. Canadian 
lawyers tend to believe that unjust enrichment is “equitable” in two 
respects. Having attributed the cause of action to the courts of chancery, 
they further insist that the availability of restitution “necessarily” turns, 
to an unusual degree, on “discretion and questions of fairness”.152 That 
would suggest that one who improves another’s land must both satisfy 
the three-part cause of action and bring the episode within the judge’s 
concept of “good conscience”. In Servello, for instance, the improver’s 
claim was dismissed because he had not come to court with “clean 
hands”.153 In truth, that additional requirement is both unprecedented 
and unprincipled. As Lord Goff once explained, “restitution is not … a 
matter of discretion … A claim to recover money at common law is made 
as a matter of right; and even though the underlying principle of recovery 
is the principle of unjust enrichment, nevertheless, where recovery is 
150. Exceptions do exist. That is true of the action for knowing receipt, which 
provides restitution if a stranger obtains property that beneficially belongs 
to the plaintiff under a trust. See e.g. Citadel General Assurance Co v Lloyds 
Bank Canada, [1997] 3 SCR 805. Because the misdirection of trust assets 
cannot be remedied by law, the Chancellor developed a species of the 
claim in unjust enrichment. 
151. Andrew Burrows, “We Do This at Common Law But That in Equity” 
(2002) 22:1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
152. Garland, supra note 37 at para 44. 
153. Servello, supra note 35. 
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denied, it is denied on the basis of legal principle”. 154 Just as it has no 
need for a “special relationship” doctrine, so too, the modern Canadian 
principle of unjust enrichment can consistently resolve restitutionary 
claims without recourse to ill-defined notions of “equitable” fairness. 
154. Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd, [1991] 2 AC 548 at 578 (HL). See also 
Beblow, supra note 50 (cautioning against the “tendency … to view the 
action for unjust enrichment as a device for doing whatever may seem fair 
between the parties” at 987); Peel, supra note 50 (rejecting the suggestion 
that “recovery can be awarded on the basis of justice or fairness alone” 
at 767); Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987), 162 CLR 221 (HCA)
(denying that unjust enrichment entails a “judicial discretion to do 
whatever idiosyncratic notions of what is fair and just might dictate” at 
256). 
